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NOTE
BETTER KEEP YOUR HANDS ON THE WHEEL IN
THAT AUTONOMOUS CAR: EXAMINING
SOCIETY'S NEED TO NAVIGATE THE
CYBERSECURITY ROADBLOCKS FOR
INTELLIGENT VEHICLES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Envision your future self waking up Monday morning. You check
the commute time to work on your app, which has been consistently
thirty-four minutes, and establish that this is just enough time to look
over the materials for your meeting. You jump into your autonomous car
and say, "Navigation, Work," while putting on your headphones and
beginning to type your notes. After some time, you look up and realize
that the car is stuck in heavy traffic and has not even made it a quarter of
the way! In a panic, you throw off your headphones and pull up your
vehicle's on-board news telecast. The telecast describes a hacker group
taking total control of a fleet of vehicles and forcing them to a complete
standstill further down the highway. As the news camera zooms into the
section of gridlock, you see agitated commuters stepping out of their
vehicles. Realizing that the commute time on your app has jumped to
over 150 minutes, you quickly take the exit and look for an alternate
route while switching your car over to manual control. Hopelessly
speeding, you begin thinking of excuses you can tell your boss who
never liked the idea of "computerized cars" in the first place.
Remarkably, computerized technology has been utilized in vehicles
for many years.' This technology controls and monitors the vehicle
2
using millions of lines of code connected by internal networks. Today,
1. See Jim Motavalli, The Dozens of Computers That Make Modern Cars Go (and Stop),
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at B6; Jose Pagliery, Your Car Is a Giant Computer-and It Can Be
Hacked, CNN MONEY (June 2, 2014, 3:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/01/technology/
security/car-hack.
2. Motavalli, supra note 1. It has been mentioned that even basic vehicles have at least thirty
microprocessor controlled devices, known as electronic control units, and that luxury cars have even
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automated technology continues to push this technological innovation
even further, to produce a vehicle that can be engaged in auto-pilot.3 As
a result, the car, as we know it, is becoming less like a car and more like
a computer.' Current laws do not provide a viable means of addressing
the cybersecurity concerns associated with the hacking of autonomous
vehicles.' Car makers need to "reduce vulnerabilities to malware and
cyberattacks that exist in their computers on wheels as they continue to
roll out new products with even more technology." 6 Additionally,
legislatures and judges need to "examine how today's laws apply to
damage caused when hackers or terrorists exploit these vulnerabilities."
Having a viable means to address this problem would better the
welfare of the nation and provide better protection to its citizens.' This
includes "relieving the enormous emotional toll on families, . . . lives

lost, hospital stays, days of work missed, [insurance premiums,] and
property damage-totaling in the hundreds of billions of dollars each
year."' There are many concerns with these vehicles being used as
weapons in the hands of hackers. 10 Proper regulation is needed to
more. Id.
3. See Jerry Hirsch, Self-driving Cars'New Focus; Ford Teams with MIT and Stanford to
Figure Out Ways to Make Them Intuitive, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2014, at B2. An important function
for cars on autopilot includes mapping that will allow the car to plan a path to safely avoid
pedestrians and other vehicles without the need for driver intervention. Id. Some have already
driven cars with the autopilot feature available, such as the Tesla Model S P90 D, where the car had
automatic steering and lane changing. See Chris Perkins, I Tested Tesla Autopilot in Manhattan
Traffic-And Lived to Tell About It, MASHABLE (Nov. 6, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/11/06/
tesla-autopilot-new-york/#72vswYOZEkqt.
4. See Hirsch, supra note 3.
5. See Cheryl Dancey Balough & Richard C. Balough, Cyberterrorism on Wheels: Are
Today's Cars Vulnerable to Attack?, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 4 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2013/11/cyberterrorism-cars-201311.authcheckdam.pdf. In order
to adequately address cybersecurity concerns, the adoption and implementation of industry-wide
standards may be necessary-meanwhile, "cars, their owners, and passengers are vulnerable,
creating liability concerns for the automotive industry." Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8.

See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY

CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013), https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Automated Vehicles Policy.pdf (highlighting that continuing advances in automotive technology
and current research in testing new vehicles create new possibilities for improved traffic safety,
increased environmental benefits, expanded mobility, and new economic opportunities for jobs).
9. Id. ("Moreover, these dramatic changes will offer significant new opportunities for
investments in [autonomous vehicle] technologies and employment in the various industries that
develop, manufacture, and maintain them.").
10. See Tom Krishner, Hackers Find Ways to Hiack Car Computers and Take Control,
FIN. POST (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/2013/09/03/hackers-findways-to-hijack-car-computers-and-take-control/?_Isa-0376-eb6l; see also Richard Gray & Gwyn
Topham, Driverless Cars Could Face Threat from Hackers Trying to Cause Road Chaos,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2014, 12:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/21/
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prevent dangerous and unethical situations and to deter potential hackers
from taking control in the first place." Situations can include a hacker
using a hacked vehicle to inflict harm.1 2 Other possible threats include
kidnapping passengers and programming cars to forcibly slow down
traffic.' 3 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has warned that
these vehicles can be lethal weapons, emphasizing that although this
technology can have many benefits, these dangers are only a modest
representation.1 4 Studying current hacking and transportation laws, and
implementing an overarching federal statute for autonomous vehicle
regulation are strong first steps in addressing this problem.'
It has been asserted that the major obstacle to motorists and firms
adopting autonomous vehicles stems from "whether the government will
take prudent and expeditious approaches to help resolve important
questions about assigning liability in the event of an accident, the
availability of insurance, and safety regulations."" There is also the
need to consider that the change over time to autonomous vehicles
is incremental, and market penetration will increase in proportion to
the degree of consumer demand for such vehicles, as well as how

driverless-cars-hacking-threat-road-trials-january. Cybersecurity and transport experts have warned
that driverless cars need to be protected from hackers who could take control and cause chaos on the
roads. Id.
11. See Balough & Balough, supra note 5, at 2 ("[A] terrorist could control cars via malware,
using many of the same techniques for hacking into regular computers.").
12. See id. (describing how a hacker could create mayhem on the roads if he breaks into a
vehicle network, and then orders car ignitions to turn off or brakes to engage and disengage).
13. Jeffrey IC Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of Criminal
Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 393, 437 (2015) (depending on the
situation, a hacker could also be charged with kidnapping); see Ryan M. Gerdes et al., CPS: An
Efficiency-Motivated Attack Against Autonomous Vehicular Transportation, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 29TH ANNUAL COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE 99, 100-01 (2013).
14. See Mark Harris, FBI Warns Driverless Cars Could Be Used as 'Lethal Weapons,'

GUARDIAN (July 16, 2014, 6:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/16/googlefbi-driverless-cars-leathal-weapons-autonomous. At the same time, the FBI predicts that
autonomous cars "will have a high impact on transforming what both law enforcement and its
adversaries can operationally do with a car." Id. The FBI believes surveillance will be more
effective since tailing suspects will be much simpler in more technologically advanced patrol cars.
Id.
15. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars-Oh My! First
Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 619, 686-88

(2015) (describing the option of preempting inconsistent state law and creating a uniform national
autonomous vehicle legal regime for first generation autonomous vehicles).
16. See Clifford Winston & Fred Mannering, Implementing Technology to Improve Public
Highway Performance:A Leapfrog Technology from the PrivateSector Is Going to Be Necessary,

ELSEVIER 158, 164 (2014) (illustrating that the policymakers' failure to implement comparable
technology in the past creates more controversy in deciding whether the public, or the private sector,
is better able to spur such technological change that contributes to adequate growth).
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effectively safety regulations are implemented. 17 Security concerns will
undoubtedly directly impact adoption of autonomous vehicles and are
already leading to calls for proper regulation."s
This Note begins by examining the potential impact autonomous
vehicles will have on society by looking at the benefits the innovation
may employ.' Part II examines existing federal and state law in relation
to regulating autonomous vehicles.2 0 Part III focuses on the lack of
proper regulation against potential hackers of autonomous vehicles as it
relates to criminal liability.2 1 Current concerns and ideas for proper
regulation of autonomous vehicle liability with regard to the issue will
also be explored.22 Part IV argues that for regulation to be effective a
federal statute on autonomous vehicles must be crafted to include certain
vital elements, one of which includes a specialized license to operate
such a vehicle.23 The purpose of this is to facilitate law enforcement
access to evidence needed for criminal prosecution without prompting
major privacy concerns.24
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

It is important to understand that the concept of autonomous
vehicles is no longer outlandish.25 Automobile manufacturers already
have prototype vehicles that successfully completed self-driven crosscountry trips.26 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

17. See Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and
Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 339, 370 (2015) (illustrating that comprehensive
change does not come overnight-the roadways will not be instantaneously populated by a fleet of
autonomous vehicles).

18. Id. at 370-71; see Jaclyn Trop, The Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your
Car, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at Bl.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20.

See infra Part I.C.

21.
22.
23.

See infra Part HA.
See infra Part 1IIB.
See infra PartIV.

24.
25.

See infra Part V.
See Pagliery, supra note 1 ("Most people aren't aware their cars are already high-tech

computers."). Cars can already network, giving them wireless capabilities like a smartphone with
wheels. See id.; see also Anne Teigen et al., Driving the Future, ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2013, at

12, 12, 15 (illustrating how forty years ago the thought of riding in a car that can steer itself would
have been unimaginable, unlike today).
26. See Devin Coldewey, Self-Driving Car Completes Cross-Country Trip in 9 Days, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015, 3:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/driverless-car-completes-

cross-country-trip-9-days-n334776 (describing an autonomous, modified Audi Q4 SUV, created by
Delphi Automotive, equipped with cameras and laser rangefinders, that completed a 3400-mile trip
across the country).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/14

4

Wing: Better Keep Your Hands on the Wheel in That Autonomous Car: Exami

2016]

KEEP YOUR HANDS ON THE WHEEL IN THATAUTONOMOUS

CAR

711

("NHTSA") segments vehicle automation into six levels ranging from
vehicles without any automated control systems (level zero) to fully
automated vehicles (level five), based on definitions created by
SAE International ("SAE").27 Subpart A introduces the concept and
performance of autonomous vehicles, and follows with their benefits and
uses in Subpart B. 28 Then, Subpart C analyzes current federal and state
laws that relate to autonomous vehicles.2 9
A.

Functionalityand Technology ofAutonomous Vehicles

The discussion in this Note generally refers to full (level five)
automation, defined as an "automated system [that] can perform all
driving tasks, under all conditions that a human driver could perform." 30
The design will anticipate the driver, will provide navigational input, and
will not require any driver control. In fact, the vehicle does not even
need to be occupied by a person." Automobile manufacturers indicate
that autonomous vehicles will be interconnected.3 2 The vehicle-tovehicle ("V2V") and vehicle-to-infrastructure ("V21") technologies will
facilitate interconnected communications via wireless data exchanges
between vehicles and nearby entities.33 Interconnected communications
27. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES
POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 9 (2016), http://www.

nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/av/pdf/FederalAutomatedVehiclesPolicy.pdf.

Level zero has no automation,

where the driver is in complete control of primary vehicle controls such as braking, steering,
throttle, and motive power at all times. Id Levels one and two have function-specific automation,

where the driver has overall control but can choose to give up limited authority over a primary
control to the vehicle, such that the vehicle can assume limited authority over that primary control.

Id. Level three has combined function automation, where at least two primary control functions are
designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control over those functions. Id. Level four has

limited self-driving automation, which would enable the driver to cede full control over all safetycritical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions. Id Level five has full selfdriving automation, where the driver will solely provide destination or navigation input, and is not
expected to be available for control at anytime during the trip. Id.
28. See infra Part H.A-B.

29. See infra Part I.C.
30.

See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 27, at 9.

31.

Id at 9-10.

32.

Dave Guilford, Like EVs, Self-Guided Cars Need Infrastructure, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS

(Mar. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140310/OEM06/303109959/likeevs-self-guided-cars-need-infrastructure.
33. Stephen P. Wood et al., The PotentialRegulatory Challenges ofIncreasinglyAutonomous

Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1434 (2012); see Gurney, supranote 13, at 400-01.
V2V technology is automobile technology that essentially lets vehicles communicate with
each other by broadcasting their position, speed, and other data to nearby vehicles. See Olivia
Marcus, Car-to-CarCommunication May Hit Roads Soon, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:00 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/03/04/car-to-car-communication-may-hit-roads-soon.

This information is then used to communicate with other vehicles to avoid crashes and accidents. Id.
V21 technology, like V2V technology, is automotive technology that lets vehicles communicate
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may produce information on other vehicles, traffic conditions, road
work, and the like. This "enables a vehicle to sense threats and
hazards .

..

; calculate risk; issue driver advisories or warnings; or take

pre-emptive actions to avoid and mitigate crashes."3 4 The global
positioning system ("GPS") is an example of currently available
technology that provides information not just useful for driving purposes
but also potentially valuable for V2V and V21 communications.3 5
Another example is lane departure warning, which alerts a driver when
the vehicle begins to drift out of the lane of travel.3 6
Companies developing these types of autonomous vehicles include
Google, Apple, Tesla, and Toyota.37 The systems will use on-board
technology to evaluate traffic conditions, make decisions, and take
action while driving." Since autonomous vehicles will require an
incredible amount of information about the road to navigate safely, Tesla
is not only mapping the roads but also each lane.3 9
B.

Benefits and Uses That Support a Possible Smart Vehicle Market

The paramount benefit of autonomous vehicles, proven through
testing, is increased road safety.40 It is believed that driver error is the
with infrastructures by sharing data, such as stop light information. See Richard Read, Vehicle-toInfrastructure Technology, on the Road in Germany, CAR CONNECTION (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.thecarconnection.com/news/1080042_vehicle-to-infrastructure-technology-on-the-road-

in-germany. This information is also used to prevent crashes and accidents. Id.
34.

What Public Officials Need to Know About Connected Vehicles, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP.,

http://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/pdf/JPOPublicOfficials v6.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
35. See Wood et al., supranote 33, at 1429.
36. Id. at 1429-30 (describing lane departure warning as a system that does not intervene to
prevent the driver from departing the lane, and merely monitors the lane markings on the road to
determine whether the vehicle is keeping within the lane).
37. See Nathan Bomey, Secret's Out: Toyota Also Making a Self-Driving Car, USA TODAY,
Oct. 7, 2015, at 2B; Associated Press, Google Expects Public in Driverless Cars in 2 to 5 Years,

Fox NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/auto/2015/01/15/google-expects-public-indriverless-cars-in-2-to-5-years.html ("Google is working on sensors to detect road signs and other
vehicles, and software that analyzes all the data."); Fred Lambert, Elon Musk on Tesla Fully
Autonomous Car: 'What We've Got Will Blow People's Minds, It Blows My Mind... It'll Come
Sooner Than People Think,' ELECTREK (Aug. 3, 2016), https://electrek.co/2016/08/03/elon-musktesla-filly-autonomous-car-blows-mind- Nick Statt, Apple Is Already Testing Self-Driving Cars
Amid 'Reboot' of Project, VERGE (Sept. 9, 2016, 9:02 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/9/9/
12868610/apple-self-driving-electric-cars-titan-project-testing.
38.
39.

See Bomey, supranote 37.
See Chris Perkins, Tesla Is Mapping the Earth, 'Cause Your GPS Won't Cut It for Self-

Driving Cars, MASHABLE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/10/14/tesla-high-precisiondigital-maps/#72vswYOZEkqt. Tesla is creating this map by acquiring data through its driverseach Tesla Model S is connected to the cloud where the cars contribute to the shared database called
a fleet learning network. Id
40. See Lauren Keating, The Driverless Car Debate: How Safe Are Autonomous Vehicles?,

TECH TIMES (July 28, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/67253/20150728/
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main reason behind over ninety percent of all crashes, with the main
causes being "drunk driving, distracted drivers, failure to remain in one
lane and [failure] to yield the right of way." 4 1 Recent research has also
shown that the majority of accidents involving autonomous vehicles on
the road were not the fault of the autonomous vehicle but, rather, caused
by human inattention in the non-autonomous vehicle.42 To illustrate,
Google has revealed that other drivers have hit the firm's cars fourteen
times since the start of their testing in 2009, and stated that "not once has
the self-driving car been the cause of the collision."43
Reducing car accidents could also result in significant cost savings
as automobile accidents in the United States cost around $400 billion per
year-as measured in deaths, health care, property loss, insurance, and
traffic congestion costs." Additionally, autonomous vehicles would
driverless-cars-safe.htm. Since autonomous vehicles will be able to travel at a much higher speed
and closer to other cars without the concern of hitting each other, the rate of traffic and congestion
can be reduced. Id. This would lead to a decrease in the amount of time individuals spend traveling,
while simultaneously increasing productivity since people do not actually have to drive cars. Id; see
also Andy Sharman, Automated Autos May Be a Game Changerfor Health and Safety, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d6de9398-982b-l1e5-95c7-d47aa298f769. Reducing
the economic costs stemming from vehicle accidents can be achieved "by taking away control from
the people who cause more than 90 percent of road accidents-human drivers." Id. Autonomous
vehicles are a potential game changer for the health and safety of roads with their potential to reduce
accidents because of their increased situation awareness. Id.
41. See Keating, supra note 40.
42. See Jerry Hirsh & Joseph Serna, Cars Without Drivers Rack up Crashes; Human ErrorIs
Cited in the Four Accidents Involving Self-Driving Cars Since September, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
2015, at Cl; see also Mark Prigg, Google Self-Driving Car Is Involved in Its FirstInjury Accident:
Tech Giant's Autonomous Car Is Rear-Ended Causing 'Minor Whiplash' to Three Employees,
DAILY MAIL (July 16, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3164675/Aself-driving-SMASH-Watch-Google-s-autonomous-car-rear-ended-firm-admits-drivers-hittingsurprisingly-often.html. In addition, Google's cars have been driven more than 700,000 miles on
public roads without causing a crash. See Associated Press, supra note 37. Although not an example
of a level five full self-driving autonomous vehicle, there was an incident where the driver of an
auto-pilot assist vehicle (Tesla Model S) crashed into an eighteen-wheel truck trailer-allegedly

stemming from the auto-pilot driver's inattentiveness. See Sam Levin & Nicky Woolf, Tesla Driver
Killed While Using Autopilot Was Watching Harry Potter, Witness Says, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2016,

1:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/01/tesla-driver-killed-autopilot-selfdriving-car-harry-potter.
43.

See Prigg, supra note 42. But see Alex Davies, Google's Self-Driving Car Caused Its

First Crash, WIRED (Feb. 29, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-selfdriving-car-may-caused-first-crash ("A public transit bus was approaching from behind. The Google
AV test driver saw the bus approaching in the left side mirror but believed the bus would stop or
slow . . as the Google AV was reentering the center of the lane it made contact with the side of the

bus.").
44.

See Jeffery K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: ProductsLiability and Accidents Involving

Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 247, 251 (2013). The World Health
Organization states that about 1,250,000 people die each year from car accidents, and that at

least 20,000,000 people suffer non-fatal injuries in car accidents. See Road Traffic Injuries,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs358/en (last visited Dec. 31,
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harmonize traffic flow and, in turn, increase fuel efficiency.4 5 Using
V2V and V21 technology, autonomous vehicles will be able to share
information with each other better than human drivers and will benefit
from what every other car has learned on the road.46 Driving will
become a networked activity, leading to greater cooperation and
efficiency, rendering steering wheels, rear-view mirrors, and horns
obsolete.4 7 Vehicles on the market have already made some of this
technology possible, as new cars such as the Tesla Model X have
demonstrated the use of advanced sensors and software to detect an
impending crash and automatically apply the brakes.48
C. Existing Law andRegulations Within the Sphere of
Autonomous Vehicles
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 ("Safety Act")49 to reduce injuries and deaths resulting from
operational and non-operational safety hazards attributed to motor
vehicles."o A few years later, the NHTSA was established within the
U.S. Department of Transportation, pursuant to the Highway Safety Act
of 1970." Much of the NHTSA's authority is derived from the Safety
2016); Auto Crashes, INS. INFO. INST. (Sept. 2016), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/auto-crashes
(describing a statistic limited to information put together by the NHTSA).
45.

See Gurney, supra note 44, at 251 (illustrating that this will help protect the environment

and save consumers money-Americans used 2.8 billion gallons of excess gasoline totaling $87.2
billion in 2007 alone).
46. See Reid Hoffman, Driving in the Networked Age, LINKEDIN PULSE (July 18, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/driving-networked-age-reid-hoffinan

(showing that present cars

already act as network node driving apps like Waze, which uses smart phone GPS capabilities to
crowd source real-time traffic levels, road conditions, and even gas prices).

47. Id. These benefits might be "so significant that in time the public will demand
prohibitions against old-fashion driving in most public places." Id.
48. Timothy B. Lee, Tesla's Model X SUV Is Ludicrously Fast and Ludicrously Expensive,
Vox (Sept. 30, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/30/9428011/tesla-model-x-explained.
Other sensors on the Model X have additional capabilities, such as detecting the driver's approach

and opening the doors automatically, as well as measuring the distance to objects both above and
beside the vehicle when its falcon-wing doors open-these doors swing in an upward, folding
fashion and compensate to avoid surrounding objects. Id.

49. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(repealed 1994). The Safety Act was originally codified in chapter 38 of title 15 of the U.S. Code.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988) (repealed 1994). Years later, the Safety Act was repealed by the
Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, but its substance was recodified in chapter
301 of title 49 of the U.S. Code. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30183 (2012).
50. See 49 U.S.C.§ 30101; 15 U.S.C. § 1381; Wood et al., supra note 33, at 1434-35.
51. Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 1713, 1739 (repealed
1983); see 23 U.S.C. § 401 note (2012) (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Creation;
Appointment of Administrator and Deputy Administrator; Duties; Retroactive Effect). The
NHTSA's authority remained, pursuant to the Act of January 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, § 1(b),
96 Stat. 2413, 2415 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 105).
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Act, such as its power to set safety standards for motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment and its control over the "recall and remedy of
vehicles and equipment that do not comply with the standards in place at
the time of manufacture." 5 2 A standard promulgated by the NHTSA
must "be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be
stated in objective terms."5 In addition, 49 U.S.C. § 30102(b)(9) makes
clear that each standard must relate to performance.54
The NHTSA, which has broad authority over motor vehicle safety,
has been very active in promoting autonomous vehicles. Since the
development of autonomous vehicles is still in the early stages, the
NHTSA remains deferential to individual states. 56 This is evidenced by
the relative surge of state legislation that permits testing of autonomous
vehicles." However, none of this enacted legislation addresses any real
future user operation of autonomous vehicles. States have delayed
52.

Wood et al., supra note 33, at 1435 (explaining that the NHTSA is also authorized to

conduct investigations about possible safety defects); see 49 U.S.C.

§§

30101, 30111-30128.

Further, a self-certification framework has been created to help ensure compliance-the NHTSA
promulgates standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment and, in turn, manufacturers

are required to certify that their products conform. 49 U.S.C.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a).
54. Id. § 30102(a)(9); see id. §§ 30102(a)(8), 30111.

§ 30115.

55. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 8, at 1-2 (reasoning that this
statement is issued for the purpose of helping states implement the new autonomous vehicle

technology safely so that its full benefits can be realized). The NHTSA has been conducting
research on vehicle automation for many years-this research has lead to some regulatory and
policy developments, including work on electronic stability control ("ESC"), and crash avoidance
technologies such as lane departure warning and forward collision warning. Id. at 5-6. This has led
to the development of standards that require mandatory ESC technology on all light vehicles, and
reports on crash avoidance features that are noted on equipped models in a New Car Assessment

Program-for the purpose of encouraging consumers to consider choosing specific models. Id.
56.

See id. at 10 ("In general, we believe that states are well suited to address issues such as

licensing, driver training, and conditions for operation related to specific types of vehicles.").
However, the agency does express their preference that states not permit operation of autonomous
vehicles for purposes other than testing based on many considerable concerns. Id.; see also William
J. Kohler & Alex Colbert-Taylor, CurrentLaw andPotentialLegal Issues Pertainingto Automated,
Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 109-10 (2015) (noting

that the NHTSA "does not appear ready to issue its own nationwide regulations specifically relating
to autonomous vehicles").
57. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 112-18; see also Autonomous: SelfDriving Vehicles Legislation, NCSL (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/
autonomous-vehicles-legislation.aspx (stating that sixteen states introduced legislation relating to
autonomous vehicles in 2015, compared with twelve states in 2014, nine states in 2013, and six
states in 2012). Three states had already enacted legislation to legalize the operation of autonomous

vehicles on public roads for testing purposes at the time the NHTSA issued its 2013 Preliminary
Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles. Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at

112.
58. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 120. Apart from pre-operation
requirements, some states have only instituted "stipulations for insurance, safety mechanisms, and a
human operator." Id. The state's enacted legislation has "either authorized the eventual deployment
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passing autonomous vehicle laws until a liability scheme can be
adopted.59 In the next Subpart, this Note starts by introducing current
federal law and regulation directly addressing autonomous vehicles,
followed by an introduction of relevant state law and regulation.60 Other
federal laws that have an indirect influence on the regulation of
autonomous vehicles will then be discussed.61
1. Possible Federal Laws and Regulations
There is currently no federal law or regulation explicitly prohibiting
the use of autonomous vehicles outside the context of testing.62
Therefore, from the NHTSA's recommendations, operating autonomous
vehicles on public roads appears to be illegal in the absence of state or
federal laws specifically authorizing their use.6 3 It is important to note
that "vehicle technologies that make autonomous operation possible are
vastly different than those that existed when the Safety Act was enacted
in 1966"-a time when "vehicle operating systems were largely
mechanical and controlled by the driver via mechanical inputs and
linkages."' In contrast, modern vehicles possess an ever-increasing
number of electronic functions that can be controlled automatically by
electronic control units, and the "operation of those units can be
substantially altered by post-manufacture software updates." 65
of autonomous vehicles for operation. . . or remained silent on the issue." Id.

59.

See Gurney, supra note 44, at 250 (asserting that though some states have passed an

autonomous vehicle law, no states have permitted driverless autonomous cars, yet). Arizona is

among the states who delayed in passing such laws based on debates and controversial issues
involving the assignment of liability should an accident occur. See Dan Strumpf, Liability Issues
CreatePotholes on the Road to DriverlessCars, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2013, at Bl.

60.
61.

See infra Part II.C. 1-2.
See infra PartI.C.3.

62. Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 110.
63. Id. NHTSA recommends that states not permit operation of an autonomous vehicle for
purposes other than testing for the time being. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
supranote 8, at 12-13, 14. But see Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are ProbablyLegal in

the United States, 1 TEx. A&M. L. REv. 411, 413 (2014) (arguing that operating autonomous
vehicles on public roads and highways is legal because they are not explicitly prohibited by any
laws under the United States nor the Geneva Convention). However, Michigan is one state that
recently enacted a ban on operation of autonomous vehicles outside the context of testing. See

MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 257.663 (2014).
64. See Wood et al., supra note 33, at 1438-39 ("Components and systems were either
designed into the vehicle at the time of original manufacture or were later attached to or physically
carried in the vehicle."); see also Jerry Flint & Douglas Flint, The Real Cause of Toyota's Problems,
FoRBES (Feb. 23, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/23/flint-autos-toyota-businessrecall.html. The article states, "In the old days incorrectly installed linkages or other mechanical
problems, such as broken motor mounts" can cause runaway acceleration. Flint & Flint, supra. And,
in the 1980s, although some car components became electronic, parts, like the throttle, were still a
cable linkage to the gas pedal. Id.
65. See Wood et al., supra note 33, at 1439 (highlighting advances in communications
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The NHTSA's authority extends to new motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment. "Motor vehicle" is defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102(a)(6) as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power
and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and
highways."" "Motor vehicle equipment" is defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102(a)(7) as follows:
(A) [A]ny system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally
manufactured; (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold
for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as
an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle; or (C) any device or an
article or apparel, including a motorcycle helmet and excluding
medicine or eyeglasses prescribed by a licensed practitioner .... 67
The definition of motor vehicle equipment is noticeably broader, and
this effectively establishes the outer limits of the NHTSA's authority.
A federal privacy statute that governs personal information and
may have a potential impact on autonomous vehicles is the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA").6 8 The DPPA protects an
individual's personal information held by a state's department of motor
vehicles ("DMV") against disclosure without the written consent of that
individual, unless a statutory exception applies.69 A protected "motor
vehicle record" is defined as "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle
operator's permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or
identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles."7
Although the DPPA seems to protect not only drivers but also their
motor vehicle records, it is still important to point out that classification
of a "driver" or "operator" in autonomous vehicles may be different.'
technology, making it possible for devices with vehicle-related capabilities to be compatible with
the vehicle).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6) (2012). Motor vehicle can include trailers but generally excludes
vehicles that only use public roads for limited durations and vehicles that run exclusively on rails.
See Wood et al., supranote 33, at 1439 n.48.
67. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(7); see Wood et al., supra note 33, at 1439-40.
68. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2012)).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2721; see Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2222 (2013) (holding that
respondent lawyers' use of information from the department of motor vehicles fits within the
exception delineated in § 272 1(b)(4)). Subsection (b)(4) allows permissible use as follows:
[I]n connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any
Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the
service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or
enforcement ofjudgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local
court.
18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4).
70. Id. § 2725.
71. See infra Part V.B.
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Numerous federal communications statutes may also apply
depending on the technologies used in the autonomous vehicles,
including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 72
Telecommunications Act, 73 and Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act ("CALEA").74 Under the Telecommunications Act, the
consumer propriety network information ("CPNI") of autonomous
vehicles, which includes information that relates to the quantity,
technical configuration, destination, location, and amount of use of a
telecommunications service subscribed, may be protected. 75 The
CALEA might require telecommunications carriers, which includes
autonomous vehicles if it should be classified as one, to facilitate law
enforcement access to telecommunications networks.76 It has been
pointed out that since V2V might extend to V21 communication
networks, which in turn are connected to the Internet or telephone
systems, these communication networks would probably be subject to
the CALEA requirements. 7 Regardless, the ECPA might permit law
enforcement access to autonomous vehicle communications with a
warrant. 78 Access to stored data in the vehicles based on a reasonable
72. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511).
73. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
74. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012)).
75. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) ("Every telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the
confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other telecommunication carriers,
equipment manufacturers, and customers, including telecommunication carriers reselling
telecommunications services provided by a telecommunications carrier."); Glancy, supra note 15, at

679 (stating that CPNI is also made available to the carrier by the customer through a carriercustomer relationship).
76. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (requiring every telecommunications carrier to "ensure that its
equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate,
terminate, or direct communications are capable of-(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the
government ... to intercept .. . all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within

a service area"); Glancy, supra note 15, at 680 (highlighting that this could be done through
CALEA solution switches that enable law enforcement interception). Additionally, the Federal

Communications Commission, "which has jurisdiction to prescribe 'such rules as are necessary to
implement' CALEA requirements, [has in the past,] extended the reach of CALEA [with] Voice
over Internet Protocol (VolP) and [other] facilities-based broadband." Id.
77. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 680 (reasoning that if first generation autonomous vehicles
communicate only over V2V applications, they might very well avoid having to comply with law
enforcement access through CALEA). However, V21 systems are connected to the Internet and

public telephone systems, and such communications would be subject to CALEA requirements. Id.
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a) (2012) (setting out punishment for "any person who-(a)
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication"); Glancy, supranote 15, at 681 (agreeing

that this existing privacy compromising law may permit law enforcement access to personal
information and communications and would likely apply to autonomous vehicle communications);
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belief that the records are relevant and material to a criminal
79
investigation can be allowed under the Stored Communications Act.
2. Mandated State Laws and Regulations
Dorothy J. Glancy states that "[f]irst generation autonomous cars
will almost certainly have to comply with then-applicable state roadway
laws and regulations" in the absence of federal preemption, since "each
state owns and controls the highways and roadways within that state,
including interstate highways."so States currently authorizing the testing
of autonomous vehicles include California, Florida, Michigan, and
Nevada.s" When establishing these laws, the NHTSA recommended that
states enforce four basic principles: (1) the process for transitioning from
self-driver mode to driver control is safe, simple, and timely; (2) the selfdriving test vehicles have the capability to detect, record, and inform the
driver that the system of automated technologies has malfunctioned; (3)
the installation and operation of any self-driving vehicle technologies
not disable any federally required safety features or systems; and (4) the
self-driving test vehicles record information about the status of the
automated control technologies in the event of a crash or loss of vehicle
83
control.82 States have more or less followed these recommendations.
see also Peter Van Valkenburgh, What's So Bad About ECPA?, TECH FREEDOM (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://techfreedom.org/post/68822183836/whats-so-bad-about-ecpa (arguing that there are many

problems with the ECPA actually protecting data-the ECPA is old, complicated and doesn't cover
what it should). The ECPA does not make data obtained without a proper warrant inadmissible at
trial. Van Valkenburgh, supra.

79. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C §§ 2701-2712) (setting out punishment for "accesses without authorization [to] a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided," except for a required disclosure
under § 2703); see Glancy, supra note 15, at 681 (stating that access to the stored data only requires
a subpoena, or a court order under § 2703(d)); see also Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at

125 (citing In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013)). In the
context of a criminal investigation, and authorized under § 2703(d), the police did not commit a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment by requesting a court order requiring disclosure of historical
location data without first obtaining a warrant or showing probable cause. See In re U.S. for

HistoricalCell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 602, 615.
80. Glancy, supra note 15, at 653 (believing that this makes the states' interest in regulation
and use of state property strong); see also NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 8,

at 11-12 (providing recommendations for state regulations that govern the testing of self-driving
vehicles).
81. See Autonomous: Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, supranote 57; see also Jack Boeglin,
The Costs of Self-Driving Cars: Reconciling Freedom and Privacy with Tort Liability in

Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 171, 172-73 (2015) (explaining that even
more states are considering similar legislative initiatives due to the high stakes involved from the
amount of car crashes that occur every year).
82. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 8, at 13-14. The first principle
recommends a driver who is familiar with the particular vehicle's automated systems and can

"quickly and easily retake control of the vehicle from the automated system." Id. at 13. The second
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Nevada was the first state to authorize the operation of autonomous
vehicles for testing and defines an autonomous vehicle as one "equipped
with autonomous technology" that "has the capability to drive the motor
vehicle without the active control or monitoring of a human operator." 8 4
Nevada further required the vehicle be equipped with safety measures,
including a means of easily engaging and disengaging the autonomous
technology and a mechanism of alerting the human operator to take
control if the autonomous technology fails." Other regulations adopted
by Nevada require that there be special driver's license certification and
plates, pre-operation certifications, and an insurance deposit of
$5,000,000.86 This requires the state DMV to set up a regulation for

establishing driver license endorsement for the operation of an
autonomous vehicle on the highways of the State."
Florida enacted legislation incorporating testing provisions similar
to Nevada regarding autonomous vehicles, with nearly identical
language in defining autonomous vehicle technology.88 Florida defines
an operator to include someone who causes the "autonomous technology
to engage, regardless of whether or not that person is physically present

principle recommends the vehicles have this capability of recording such occurrences so that it can
be easy to "establish the cause of any such malfunction, degradation and control failure." Id. The
third principle says federal laws should prohibit manufacturers, dealers, and repairman of motor
vehicles from "making inoperative any federally required [safety] system[]." Id. The fourth
principle suggests a regulation which would require the "vehicle owner make available to the state
all data recorded by the vehicle [EDR] in the event of a crash." Id. at 14.
83. See infra Part II.C.2.
84. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.025, .030 (2014) (adding that autonomous technology does not
include an active safety system nor a system for driver assistance "including . . . a system to provide
electronic blind spot detection, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, adaptive
cruise control, lane keeping assistance, lane departure warning, or traffic jam and queuing
assistance," unless the vehicle with which such system is installed can utilize the system without
driver assistance or monitoring); see Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 113 (stating that
Nevada was also the first state to require its DMV to propose autonomous vehicle regulations).
85. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.080 ("An autonomous vehicle shall not be registered in this
State unless the autonomous vehicle meets all federal standards and regulations that are applicable
to a motor vehicle.").
86. Id. § 482A.060 (requiring proof of insurance or self-insurance acceptable to the DMV in
the amount of $5 million before the person can begin testing an autonomous vehicle on a highway
in the state). An electronic data recorder, for storing information about the condition of the vehicle
system for at least thirty seconds prior to an accident, separate from the NHTSA-mandated EDR,
might also be one of the requirements. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A. 110 (2014); see also Kohler
& Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 113.
87. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.200.
88. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 114 (highlighting similarities such as
required safety measures, surety deposit, and the release of liability for vehicle manufacturers).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (West 2014), with NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.025, .030
(showing identical language).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/14

14

Wing: Better Keep Your Hands on the Wheel in That Autonomous Car: Exami

2016]

KEEP YOUR HANDS ON THE WHEEL IN THATAUTONOMOUS

CAR

721

89
in the vehicle while [it operates] in autonomous mode." Legislation
enacted in California also uses language similar to that of Nevada and
90
Florida but with additional specifications with regards to liability.
California defines the manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle as the one
who "originally manufactures [the] vehicle and equips [the vehicle with]
autonomous technology," whether or not that person is the original
manufacturer of the underlying vehicle." In addition, the original
manufacturer is not released from liability resulting from third-party
installation of autonomous technology, and there is no designation that a
third-party installer is liable for defects. 92 Like Nevada, the vehicle must
also contain a separate device that stores autonomous technology sensor
data for thirty seconds before a crash, which must be made available for
three years after the accident. 93
Michigan passed legislation permitting operation of autonomous
vehicles for testing purposes but is the only state to specifically ban
94
operation for non-testing purposes. Before testing, Michigan requires
registration of special license plates, and the vehicle can only be
operated by an employee or other person authorized by the automated
technology manufacturer. 95 Michigan incorporates civil penalties for
violating autonomous vehicle laws, which include "remov[ing] liability
for vehicle manufacturers if damages were caused by autonomous
technology and that technology was installed by a third party without the
vehicle manufacturer's involvement."9 6 Other laws that were passed also

89. FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85(2), .86(1) (adding that such operators, for the purposes of testing
the vehicle, include employees, contractors, or other persons designated by manufacturers of
autonomous technology).
90. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2014). An additional specification includes sensor data
from accidents be captured, stored, and preserved for three years after the date of collision in a readonly format. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(G).
91. Id. § 38750(a)(5) ("A 'manufacturer' of autonomous technology is ... [also] the person
that modifies the vehicle by installing autonomous technology to convert it to an autonomous
vehicle after the vehicle was originally manufactured.").
92. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 115; see also Boeglin, supra note 81, at
174 (stating that although California originally stipulated that "'the conversion of vehicles originally
manufactured by a third party shall control issues of liability arising from the operation of an
autonomous vehicle,' the legislation struck this provision on reconsideration").
93. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(G), with NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.1 10 (2014)
(showing similar language).
94. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 257.663 (2014) (providing that a "person shall not operate an
automated motor vehicle upon a highway or street in automatic mode" unless operation falls under a
section 665 exception-for the purpose of research or testing the autonomous vehicle).
95. Id. §§ 257.244(3), .665(2)(a). Much like the other states, the individual, who has the
ability to monitor the vehicle's performance, must also be present in the vehicle while it is being
operated such that immediate control of the vehicle's movement is possible when necessary. Id.

§ 257.663(2)(b).
96. Id. § 257.666; Kohler & Colbert-Taylor,
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require that autonomous vehicles cede operational authority to human
users whenever a human user requests control, despite motivation from
legal and economic pressures that might eventually restrict the frequency
and scope of human driving.9 7 Additional laws were motivated by
the threat autonomous vehicles pose to user privacy.98 For example,
California demands that the "manufacturer of the autonomous [vehicle]
technology . . provide a written disclosure to the purchaser of an
autonomous vehicle that describes what information is collected by the
autonomous technology equipped on the vehicle." 99
Despite early action taken by some states to regulate autonomous
vehicles on their public roads, many other states have attempted but
failed to pass such bills.' Arizona introduced legislation that would not
require a person to be seated in an autonomous vehicle-a major
difference from the states that have enacted laws."0 ' This bill failed to
clear Arizona's House Transportation Committee. 10 2 In 2015, the
Oregon legislature failed to pass a bill through their Transportation
Committee because of concerns over the unforeseeable risks of
automated vehicles.10 3 New Jersey's proposed legislation also failed to
clear their own committee after Scott Mackey, a representative from the
97. CAL. VEH. CODE

§ 38750(c)(1)(D)

(requiring the autonomous vehicle to "allow the

operator to take control in multiple manners, including ... the use of the brake, the accelerator
pedal, or the steering wheel" while alerting the operator that autonomous mode has been

disengaged); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.190(2)(g); see Boeglin, supra note 81, at 173 (highlighting
the fact that automobiles have stood as a symbol of freedom and personal autonomy for

generations); Philip E. Ross, Driverless Cars: Optional by 2024, Mandatory by 2044, IEEE
SPECTRUM (May 29, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/advanced-cars/
driverless-cars-optional-by-2024-mandatory-by-2044 (arguing that autonomous vehicles might be
so common that humans will be forced into the passenger seat).
98.

See infra note 99 and accompanying text.

99. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(h); see Boeglin, supra note 81, at 174 (suggesting that the
potential of autonomous vehicles infringing on privacy is so grave that self-driving cars should be
prohibited altogether). In a poll regarding such privacy matters, seventy-five percent of respondents
were concerned that companies would use software that controls a self-driving car to collect
personal data, and seventy percent were worried that data would be shared with the government. See

Joseph B. White, The Big Worry About Driverless Cars? Losing Privacy, WALL ST. J. (June 3,
2013, 1:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2013/06/03/the-big-worry-about-driverless-carslosing-privacy. In addition, eighty-one percent of the respondents were either very or somewhat
concerned about the threat that hackers could gain control of a self-driving vehicle. Id.
100.

See Autonomous: Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, supra note 57 (listing Connecticut,

Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, and Texas among states that introduced legislation
in 2015 but failed to enact the bill); see also Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 118-19
(believing that such failure illustrates some of the issues that stand in the way of universal state
acceptance of autonomous vehicles).
101. See H.B. 2167, 51st Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013).
102. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 118.
103. S.B. 620, 78th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015); see Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note
56, at 119; Autonomous: Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, supra note 57.
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Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, said that state legislation on
automated vehicles was premature.'" He believed that "if each state
enacted slightly different regulations, it would [make it] difficult for
manufacturers to standardize the technology for the wider market.""os
Mackey's statements suggest that federal, rather than state, regulations
0
for autonomous vehicles can promote their use more quickly."

"

3. Vehicle Law or Computer Law?
Autonomous vehicles may also be incidentally influenced by other
existing federal and state criminal laws."0 7 An attack might be staged by
exploiting a vehicle's electronic control unit, either physically or through
the V2V or V21 communication systems.' 0 Such an attempt to exploit
and gain control over an electronic control unit would likely subject the
attacker to federal criminal liability under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA"), 109 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"),110 and USA PATRIOT Act ("PATRIOT Act").
An electronic control unit, which is a high-speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, may qualify
12
as a "protected computer" pursuant to the CFAA.1 The electronic
104. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 119; see also Andrew George, Driverless
Cars... in NJ? Assembly Panel Considers Legislation Authorizing Tests, NJBIZ (Nov. 25,

2013, 3:16 PM), http://www.njbiz.com/article/20131125/NJBIZ01/131129789/driverless-cars-innj-assembly-panel-considers-legislation-authorizing-tests (stating that Scott Mackey believes the
prospect of driverless cars on the road is still ten years away).

105. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 119.
106. Id. Other statements include that "it would be best if there was a broader approach."
George, supranote 104.

107. See Gurney, supra note 13, at 410-11 (asserting that autonomous vehicles will implicate
criminal laws-including vehicle-related criminal laws, and those not necessarily related to
vehicles, but will intersect with autonomous vehicles-because the technology is operated by a
computer); see also Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supranote 56, at 133-34.
108. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 133-34. An attack can be carried out by
exploiting the vehicle's EDR system, which is accessible wirelessly and communicates remotely
with other response towers. Id.; see also Balough & Balough, supra note 5, at 3.

109. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
110. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17, 28 U.S.C.); see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
111. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)-(2); see Balough & Balough, supranote 5, at 3 (highlighting that,
even if the vehicle itself is not a protected computer, the pathway for hacking the electronic control
unit may involve a protected computer). When a person takes the vehicle to a dealership for
maintenance, he or she connects that vehicle to the dealer's computer-the dealer's computer is a

protected computer under the CFAA since it is connected to the Internet. Balough & Balough, supra
note 5, at 3; see also Gurney, supra note 13, at 439-41 (stating that an autonomous vehicle's
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control unit must be deemed "a computer . .. used in or affecting

interstate or foreign commerce."ll 3 Vehicles, of course, have the ability
to travel across state lines, and their electronic control units could
thereby be viewed as "affecting" interstate commerce. A case of this
type could involve, for example, a hacker who willfully took control
over a vehicle's electronic control system with the intent to endanger the
safety of occupants. 114 Further, commercial autonomous vehicles could
be "used in" interstate commerce based on the Supreme Court's "in
commerce" language, which encompasses "persons or activities within
the flow of interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in
the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their
transport and distribution to the consumer.""s Hacking a vehicle
would also violate the DMCA, which "prohibits [the] circumvention
of technological measures to gain access to a copyrighted work."ll 6
Although the PATRIOT Act does not directly provide for autonomous
vehicle cyberterrorism, it addresses cyberterrorism via cars, terrorist
attacks, and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems,
and it adds a class to the CFAA-"threat[s] to public health or safety.""
Therefore, it is possible to violate the PATRIOT Act if hacking an
autonomous vehicle is classified as a threat to public health or safety."
Existing criminal laws may prohibit tampering with autonomous
vehicles and their supporting infrastructure by users or outsiders.119
computer system qualifies as a computer under the CFAA because it is an electronic device that
performs logical functions).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B); Balough & Balough, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that, if a
computing issue occurs in a single state, the "used in" interstate commerce clause is not satisfied).
114. See Gurney, supranote 13, at 440.
115. United States v. Am. Blg. Maint. Inds., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)). With respect to corporations, "[t]o be engaged 'in
commerce' within the meaning of § 7 [of the Clayton Act], a corporation must itself be directly
engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in interstate commerce."
Id. at 283; see Gurney, supra note 13, at 441 (believing that the defendants in an action for hacking
a vehicle need to raise the question of "whether the vehicle was 'used, operated, or employed in
interstate commerce').
116. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012); Balough & Balough, supra note 5, at 3-4 (referencing MDY
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2010)). A party seeking
to use the DMCA against an electronic control unit hacker must show the vehicle contains
technological measures that effectively control access. Id.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV).
118. Id.; see also Balough & Balough, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that mass transportation
systems include "passenger vessels, railroads, intercity bus transportation, school buses, and charter
and sightseeing transportation, but it does not mention private passenger vehicles or trucks").
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 32703 (2012) (stating, inter alia, that a person may not install a device
"that makes an odometer of a motor vehicle register a mileage different from the mileage the
vehicle was driven, as registered by the odometer within the designed tolerance of the manufacturer

of the odometer"); MINN. STAT.

§ 609.546
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Some states have anti-hacking laws that cover more than just physical
trespassing or vandalism. 120 For example, New York sets out computer
tampering by degree-computer tampering in the fourth degree occurs
when a person "uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer,
computer service, or computer network without authorization and he or
she intentionally alters in any manner or destroys computer data or a
computer program of another person."l 2 1
Depending on the situation, a hacker could also be charged with
kidnapping.1 22 For example, South Carolina's kidnapping statute states
that "[w]hoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap,
abduct or carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without
authority of law ... is guilty of a felony." 23 Therefore, a hacker that
changed the route of an occupied autonomous vehicle could potentially
24
be convicted of kidnapping the occupants in that vehicle.1
III.

THE NECESSITY OF PROPER REGULATION AGAINST POTENTIAL
HACKERS OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

With the immense benefit of road safety outlined in Part II, it is
believed that the main concern of autonomous vehicles is not from the
potential onset of unclear tort liabilities in connection with autonomous
vehicle road accidents but from the emergence of potential hackers to
this new technology. 125 This Part first introduces the potential
vulnerabilities of autonomous vehicles in relation to hacking.1 26 Then, it
intentionally "tamper[] with or enter[] into ... a motor vehicle without the owner's permission").
120. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 2010) (making it a misdemeanor for a person who
"knowingly uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network
without authorization").
121. Id. § 156.20.
122. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53 (2016) (making it unlawful for any person to
"forcibly seize and confine any other person, or .. . inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent
to cause such person to be confined or imprisoned against his or her will"); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-39 (2006) (punishing "[a]ny person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove
from one place to another"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (1976).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910; see State v. Porter, 698 S.E.2d 237, 243 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010)
("Kidnapping is a continuous offense that commences when one is wrongfully deprived of freedom
and continues until freedom is restored.").
124. See Gurney, supranote 13, at 438.
125.

See John Markoff, Researchers Show How a Car's Electronics Can Be Taken Over

Remotely, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at B3 (highlighting how new cellular channels offered by
electronic control units in vehicles offer many areas of exploitation for hackers); see also Andy
Greenberg, How Hackable Is Your Car? Consult This Handy Chart, WIRED (Aug. 6, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/car-hacking-chart; Alexis C. Madrigal, When Cars Are
as Hackable as Cell Phones, ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
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follows with a discussion of how current laws and ideas do not
adequately address these vulnerabilities. 127
A.

Problems and Concerns with Autonomous Vehicle Vulnerability
Could Prove Explosive

Autonomous vehicles are a major hacking concern, because unlike
an ordinary desk computer, these vehicles are physically vulnerable and
easily accessible by hackers. 128 This could lead to major problems and
concerns such as privacy, terrorist attacks, call-efficiency motivated
attacks, 129 slow criminal prosecution with no effective method of
deterrence, unclear liability issues, and other crimes such as
kidnapping.130 Senator Ed Markey has devoted attention to the
vulnerability of connected vehicles to cyberattacks, stating that the
vehicles could be hijacked and controlled to stage attacks by modifying
the operation of the vehicle.13 1 The potential vulnerabilities of
autonomous vehicles that are introduced in the following Subparts

127. See infra Part IB.
128. See Greenberg, supra note 125 (highlighting these vulnerabilities with a ninety-two-page
paper presented at a Black Hat security conference-the paper presents results from dozens of
different car makes and models, accessing vehicle schematics, and rating vehicles for potential
hackability from their networked components).
129. See Gerdes et al., supra note 13, at 99 (defining call-efficiency motivated attacks to be an
attack on a single vehicle, which yields data other autonomous vehicles utilize to operate). Thus,
slowing down the single vehicle would in turn slow down an entire pack of autonomous vehiclesknown as a platoon-on the road based on automated vehicle response. Id; see also David A.

Comelio Sosa, An Efficiency-Motivated Attack Against Vehicles in a Platoon: Local Vehicle
Control, Platoon Control Strategies, and Drive Train Technologies Considerations 14 (May 1, 2014)
(unpublished M.S. dissertation, Utah State University) (on file with the Merrill-Cazier Library, Utah
State University) (suggesting that vehicle platooning is a malicious attack, which can be the result
of a company trying to sabotage the operation of another's vehicles to make it spend more energy
than required and, thus, raise its transportation costs).
130. See Gurney, supranote 13, at 437-38 ("Depending on the situation, a hacker could also be

charged with kidnapping."); Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56 at 133 (explaining that remote
hijacking of autonomous vehicles presents a very serious risk-for instance, traffic signals are
rendered obsolete by the possibility of coordinating the flow of traffic through intersections, and
traffic from two perpendicular lanes could be made to cross paths without any vehicles slowing
down or coming to a stop); see also Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability
Issues Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1165 (2012) (discussing

several degrees of culpability from third-party interference).
131. See SEN. ED MARKEY, TRACKING & HACKING: SECURITY & PRIVACY GAPS PUT
AMERICAN DRIVERS AT RISK 5 (2015), http://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-02-

06_MarkeyReport-Tracking HackingCarSecurity/o202.pdf (presenting data from 2011 by a group
of researchers, which showed that wireless entry points in automobiles pose vulnerabilities-they
were able to remotely hack into a vehicle and exploit these vulnerabilities, which included engaging
in location tracking and eavesdropping, and controlling different features such as the locks and
brakes).
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include privacy concerns, terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, kidnapping,
and the lack of established criminal laws to deter hackers. 13 2
1. Data Use in Autonomous Vehicles and Its Overlap with the
Right to Privacy
Privacy is a critical legal implication of autonomous vehicles, and it
is made especially so with the implementation of V2V and V21
communication systems.13 3 The interconnected vehicle presents risks to
personal information by engaging in constant network communication
at the user's real-time location.1 34 In addition, potential data breaches
may cause this personal information to be extracted, hacked, or
leaked. 135 Autonomous cars "could compromise the users' privacy by
transmitting not only 'the present location of an autonomous vehicle
user and past travel pafterns' but also 'his or her future travel plans,'
which could be employed for 'targeted marketing,' 'law enforcement,'
or 'surveillance."'l 36 V2V and V21 technology can potentially send
internal vehicle status information through an external network, thereby
subjecting users to greater risk of having this information compromised
and improperly used. 137
The privacy interests of the people regarding personal information
will pose major challenges, as potential autonomous vehicle users will
be reluctant to allow their information to be collected without knowing
the inherent consequences.1 38 This is especially true today after the
132.
133.

See infra Part M.A.1-2.
See supra Part II.C.3.

134. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171,
1180 (2012) (stating that the network on which interconnected, autonomous vehicles would rely
would be used for surveillance on every other interconnected vehicle); Connected Cars Roll into
Privacy Concerns, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/
news/connected-cars-roll-into-privacy-concerns (informing the public that Ford engages in constant
network communication at the user's real-time location using GPS chips in the vehicle).
135. See Glancy, supra note 134, at 1180 (emphasizing that robust personal information
protection and network security measures are needed to guard against privacy risks).
136. See Boeglin, supra note 81, at 181 (determining that a vehicle is more likely to threaten its
passengers' safety if the vehicle is "communicative"-a communicative vehicle can relay vehicle
information to third parties, receive driving instructions from external sources, and speak with other
autonomous or communicative vehicles in its vicinity).
137. See id. Boeglin emphasizes the vulnerability of these networks by showing that over

300,000 wireless routers were hacked in 2014. Id.; see also Dan Goodin, Hackers Hiack 300,000Plus Wireless Routers, Make Malicious Changes, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 3, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://

arstechnica.com/security/2014/03/hackers-hijack-300000-plus-wireless-routers-make-maliciouschanges.

138. See Natasha Singer, Sharing Data, but Not Happily, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, at B1
(highlighting a study from the Annenberg School for Communication in which the majority of
Americans do not believe the trade-off of their personal data for giveaways and discounts is a fair

deal).
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National Security Administration leak-more people have started to
change privacy settings on their social media accounts, showing that
many do care about their personal privacy.139 This is potentially
an expansion of United States v. Jonesl4 0 and would raise Fourth
Amendment issues involving law enforcement interaction with
autonomous vehicles.141 Possible cases include that of a dishonest police
officer having a "wide latitude to remotely pull over vehicles."' 42 It
could be argued, from a public safety perspective, "that by operating an
autonomous vehicle a person lessens his reasonable expectation of
privacy typically associated with driving a car."1 43
It is expected that autonomous vehicles will require operation of a
"black box" used to reconstruct events should an incident occur, as "data
collected by the black boxes has already been the center of litigation by
law enforcement agencies .. . seeking to use the information against car
owners."'" Vehicles today are equipped with black boxes that record
information typically only accessed after traffic accidents.1 45 This and
other data recorded by vehicles are usually also gathered by car
companies.146 The pressing concern is not what the car company might
do with the data but what the government might be able to demand of
the car company, knowing that it possesses such data.1 47 As some have
illustrated, "surveillance data collected by private entities can easily be
subpoenaed or otherwise obtained by law enforcement agencies, without

139. See Byron Acohido, Snowden Effect: Young People Now Care About Privacy, USA
TODAY (Nov. 18, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/11/13/snowden-

effect-young-people-now-care-about-privacy/3517919. A poll was commissioned by an information
technology security company, ESET, which revealed that young people actually do care about the
privacy of their online personas. Id.

140. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
141. Id at 949 (holding that a GPS device used to monitor a vehicle's movements constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment).

142. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1167 (stating that giving law enforcement
officers the ability to force a vehicle pull over is potentially a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
and a "slippery slope").
143. Id (illustrating a scenario where a young child is trapped inside a hacked or
malfunctioned vehicle that is misbehaving).

144. See Trop, supra note 18. The black box is a recorder that collects information like
direction, speed and seatbelt use in a continuous loop. Id. It is in nearly every car today, and has
brought up privacy concerns on the part of the public. Id.
145. See Douma & Palodichuk, supranote 130, at 1168.
146. See Thierer & Hagemann, supranote 17, at 382 (discussing a Ford executive's comments
and response to questions about their data collection).

147. Id. Ford had said, "[W]e know everyone breaks the law, we know when you're doing it.
We have a GPS in your car, so we know what you're doing. . . [but] we don't supply that data to
anyone." Jim Edwards, Ford Exec: 'We Know Everyone Who Breaks the Law' Thanks to Our GPS

in Your Car, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ford-exec-gps2014-1.
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a warrant or probable cause."l48 These concerns are not unique to
autonomous vehicles, but they may forestall innovation and regulation if
not properly addressed.149
2. Dangers Arising from Criminal Acts and Opportunity
Hackers may stage an attack by exploiting a vehicle's electronics,
such as its event data recorder ("EDR") system.5 o This could pose a
serious risk by coordinating the flow of traffic through intersections, and
making real time speed adjustments, causing significant damage and
disruption.' The impact is magnified by the fact that each vehicle could
be used as a bomb and controlled to target specific locations or
civilians-far more dangerous than the situation in United States v.
McVeigh,15 2 where a rental truck packed with explosives was identified
after the defendant had left the scene.153 The opportunities presented by
autonomous vehicles "[are] unprecedented in the way that [they] could
allow terrorists to quickly strike targets miles away from their current
location."l54 Without serious regulation of these vehicles, the first line of
defense would be regulating the sale and distribution of explosive
material by a sort of tracking."s' With further progression, providing law
enforcement officials with tracking information may not only justify a
more reasonable basis of suspicion that would allow law enforcement to
search these vehicles but may also allow them to pull over or disable a
suspected vehicle en route. 1 6

148. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 25, 2013, 2:59
PM), http://volokh.com/2013/11/25/tort-law-vs-privacy.
149. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 383 (illustrating that concerns over privacy
are not unique to the ongoing development of autonomous vehicles, as many non-autonomous smart
vehicles already have similar concerns).
150. See Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supranote 56, at 133.
15 1. Id.
152. 940 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Colo. 1996).
153. Id. at 1545-46 (examining that the defendant was thought to have had an explosive device
in his truck, prompting investigators to evacuate all occupants from an area north of where the truck
was parked); see Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 133 ("Many autonomous vehicles
being hijacked at once in an urban center could lead to terror on the scale of the September 11
attacks.").
154. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1165-66. Another issue includes using
autonomous vehicles to deliver drugs to an obscure meeting place-the option is attractive because
in the event that the cargo is discovered, there would be no driver to arrest. Id.
155. 6 U.S.C. § 1203 (2012) (providing rules governing hazardous material highway routing);
see Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1166 (explaining that this tracking of information may
provide a reasonable basis to allow law enforcement to search a vehicle before it reaches its target).
156. See Douma & Palodichuk, supranote 130, at 1166-67.
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As first generation autonomous vehicles begin to operate on public
roads, a number of existing criminal offenses will naturally apply to
autonomous vehicles.' 57 However, it is emphasized that these traditional
legal concepts and applications may be challenged, as autonomous
vehicles can create difficult issues in criminal law, such as determining
when criminal penalties should apply to vehicle hacking that produces
undesirable consequences."s In the United States, deterrence is one
theory of punishment that society uses to police itself.' 5 9 Under this
theory, punishment serves as a function to dissuade potential criminals
from committing crimes in the first place.1 6 0 However, the dissuasion of
crimes arising from hacking autonomous vehicles remains absent.16' The
technological concepts are relatively new, and many of the problems
discussed in this Subpart, such as privacy and terrorist concerns, are not
yet adequately addressed by the U.S. government.1 62 For example, would
the need for evidence used to prosecute hackers require that operators of
autonomous vehicles turn over personal information to law enforcement
officials since the right is not covered under the Fourth Amendment or
would a warrant be required as in Riley v. California?l63 The answer to
this question would undoubtedly impact resources associated with
criminal prosecution.'"
In addition, if hackers find it easy to stage attacks with a small
likelihood of getting caught or having a severe punishment imposed,
there would be no incentive for hackers to stop if the destructive impact
of their crime is greater than the cost of their punishment.16 5 As seen
157.

See supra Part I.A.

158. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 662-63 (explaining that it is likely for autonomous vehicles
to change existing models of local traffic regulation that relies on "low-level criminal sanctions for
deterrence of a wide spectrum of anti-social behavior"). The first wave of autonomous vehicles may
lead to the legislative creation of new crimes, most of which may primarily be enforced by state and

local governments. Id. at 663.
159. See Gurney, supra note 13, at 404 (stating that the overriding objectives of criminal law
are "to make people do what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing what
society considers to be undesirable"); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§

1.5 (West Group 2d ed. 2014).
160.
161.

See LAFAVE, supranote 159.
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an

Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000)
(emphasizing that deterrence treats punishment as a tool of social control and protection by
dissuading criminals from offending).
162. See supra Parts H.A-B, i.A.2.
163. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that a warrantless search
and seizure of digital content on a cell phone is unconstitutional).

164. See infra Part IV.D-E.
165.

See supra note 161 and accompanying text; see also Gurney, supra note 13, at 404-06

(adding that the punishment should be proportional to that of the offense). The punishment for
speeding is proportional to the speed--or the potential to inflict harm-and also depends on if
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previously, the ability to use autonomous vehicles to commit crimes is
substantial, and no clear formulation on this class of criminal liability
has been established through any federal or state laws relating to
autonomous vehicles. 16 6 Many more complex crimes, such as
kidnapping and drug trafficking, may arise out of hacking autonomous
vehicles.1 67 Problems include determining whether the act of kidnapping
would be included with hacking into a vehicle and taking control of the
vehicle with someone in it.168 Therefore, the question becomes, to what
extent could hackers be prosecuted under other criminal laws?1 69 For
instance, if the hacker uses the vehicle to kill the occupants of the
autonomous vehicle, or a bystander, what would be the measure used to
prosecute that hacker for murder?' 70
Another area of potential criminal exploitation includes callefficiency motivated attacks.17 ' Call-efficiency motivated attacks focus
on causing targeted vehicles to expend excessive energy during travel
with the intent of decreasing the efficiency gains of other autonomous
vehicles driving with them.1 72 An incentive for such an attack might
come from one company seeking to reduce its competitor's profit
margins by increasing its costs for transportation.1 73 It is worth noting
that this problem depends on a certain conception of how autonomous
vehicles might operate-namely that a group of vehicles will cooperate
to act as one unit while following one another at fixed speeds.1 74

anyone was harmed. See Gumey, supra note 13, at 406. This theory should hold true at the

intersection of criminal law and vehicles, including autonomous vehicles. Id.
166. See supraParts II-III.
167.

See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1165-66; see also Gurney, supra note 13, at

437. To dealers, the drastic reduction of being physically caught while delivering drugs would be a
"welcome buffer." See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1165-66.
168. State v. Porter, 698 S.E.2d 237, 244 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that it is possible to
base a conviction for kidnapping on the restraint of the employees and customers that was incidental
to the armed robbery).

169. See Gurney, supra note 13, at 433-38 (listing various ways hackers could be prosecuted
under other criminal laws, including being charged for joyriding, grand larceny, or even murder). In
addition, both federal and state governments would be able to prosecute a hacker as long as an

applicable statute applies. See id. at 436-37.
170. See id. at 438.
171.
172.

See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
See Gerdes et al., supra note 13, at 107; Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 376.

173.
174.

See Gerdes et al., supra note 13, at 100; Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 376.
See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 376 (stating that this concern only applies in

the context of a "platoon framework," which depends on a narrow conception, and a very

specialized form of attack that would occur only in the rarest cases).
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CurrentLaws andIdeas Do Not Adequately Address These
Autonomous Vehicle Problems and Concerns

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the NHTSA can craft standards
to effectively regulate the implementation of automated vehicle
technology.17 ' These standards can be established as the automotive
industry releases the technology. 176 Congress, however, has imposed
requirements for a standard to be valid: it must be practicable and
reasonable, it must increase motor vehicle safety, and it must be stated in
objective terms. 17 7 The definitional criteria further requires that the
standard relates to performance.7 7 Lawmakers and scholars alike have
searched for solutions to the hacking concerns that surround autonomous
vehicles.1 79 Many solutions prove inadequate when analyzed in
circumstances surrounding the effective establishment of the hacker's
criminal liability."so As previously mentioned, there is a substantial
amount of failed local legislation on autonomous vehicles."s' The
inadequate amount of concrete legislation relating to specific civil
liability arising from autonomous vehicles undoubtedly creates a huge
gap to even start considering how to address specific criminal liability.' 82
1. Inadequacies of Law, Legislation, and Other Efforts in Relation
to the Autonomous Vehicle Cybersecurity Issue
There is considerable federal and state legislation relating to
computer hacking, transportation, and crimes that may naturally apply to
autonomous vehicles.' 83 The extent to which these laws may apply to
relieve concerns outlined in the previous Subpart are explored.' 84 This
Subpart returns to potential laws that may influence privacy and
security, which includes the DPPA, Telecommunications Act, ECPA,
and CALEA.' It is important to note that the possibilities of

175.

See supra Part II.C.

176. See, e.g., Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 56, at 134-38 (emphasizing that barriers to
achieve successive levels of automation must be ameliorated to arrive at levels two and three, and
eventually eliminated to arrive at level four-levels as defined by the NHTSA's 2013 Preliminary
Statement ofPolicy ConcerningAutomated Vehicles).

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

49 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012).
Id. § 30102(a)(9).
See infra Part i.B.
See infra Part U.B.
See supra Part II.C.2.

182.

See supra Part II.C.

183. See supra Part II.C.
184.

See supra Part M.A.

185.

See supra Part II.C.L
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certain laws applying, specifically those discussed in Part II, are only
possibilities, even when viewed extensively. 1 6
The DPPA does not point out whether a "driver" or an "operator"
of an autonomous vehicle falls under the Act from the protection of
personal information held by state DMVs.'1 7 It is also unclear whether
the Telecommunications Act and the CALEA would cover the CPNI of
autonomous vehicles, since the information in autonomous vehicles
might not be classified as information that relates to the use of
telecommunications services despite the fact V2V might extend to V21
communications."' Plus, even if it is assumed that the ECPA applies to
autonomous vehicle communications, it does not necessarily provide a
suitable ground for consumers to know the extent to which their personal
information is protected or whether law enforcement officials would be
able to sufficiently obtain information for prosecution of autonomous
vehicle crimes. 189 The NHTSA's proposed measures would also be
ineffective since, for now, they are purely standards for lawmakers to
follow.' 90 In fact, the NIITSA has said that before autonomous vehicles
can be made widely available, a number of technological issues, as well
as some human performance issues, must be addressed.' 9 ' The NHTSA
believes that autonomous vehicle technology is not yet at the necessary
stage of sophistication or demonstrated safety capability.19 2

186.

See supra Part II.

187. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2012)).
188. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012)); see also 47 U.S.C. § 222
(privacy of customer information).

189. Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511).
190.

See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 27, at 11-82; Wood et al.,

supra note 33, at 1447-48 (stating that although the NHTSA's authority over autonomous driving
systems is broad, it is still currently faced with the challenge of determining effective ways of
regulation).
191. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 8, at 14 ("As innovation in

this area continues and the maturity of self-driving technology increases, we will reconsider our
present position on this issue.").
192. Id. The NHTSA has also requested further information from the public on evaluating the
potential safety benefits of V2V technology and whether complementary technology can enable
self-driving vehicles over time. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) Communications, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,270, 49,275 (Aug. 20, 2014) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 571).
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2. Inadequacies of Proposals in Relation to the Autonomous
Vehicle Cybersecurity Issue
In addition to current laws relating to autonomous vehicles, there
have been proposals and ideas by legislatures and legal scholars.
Legislators attempted to regulate autonomous vehicles by implementing
safety standards, on a national level, to the vehicles' new technology.1 93
The Geolocational Privacy and Security Act,194 Online Communications
and Geolocation Protection Act,195 and Driver Privacy Actl 96 have been
attempts at a preemptive framework to govern access to data gathered by
a vehicle's EDR and geographical tracking data.' 9 The proposed
legislation could require government agencies to show probable cause
warrants to obtain geolocational information.198 One potential approach
to "addressing privacy and security concerns entails each [autonomous
vehicle] being issued unique security certificates." 19 9 This would involve
implementing a system for certifying each transmitter of information in a
vehicle to ensure that the transmitter is a trusted source.200 But the
broadcasting of a unique security certification by each vehicle still raises
concerns that the system could be used to track individual drivers.20 1
Since it is unclear what shape autonomous vehicle innovation will take
in the coming years, forbearance has also been considered to be a wise
move at this time.202 However, it does not solve the problem.203
193. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communications, 79
Fed. Reg. at 49,270.
194. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 237, 114th Cong. (2015).
195. Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (2013).
196. Driver Privacy Act, S. 1925, 113th Cong. (2014).
197. S. 237 ("[T]o specify the circumstances in which a person may acquire geolocation
information and for other purposes."). This is, in some ways, an expansion to what the ECPA
minimally provides, to cover geolocation information pertaining to another person, in addition to
any wire, oral, or electronic communication. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also
H.R. 983 (setting to amend title 18 of the U.S. Code, "with respect to disclosures to governments by
communications-related service providers of certain information consisting of or relating to
communications"); S. 1925 (declaring any data retained by a vehicle's EDR is the property of the
owner or lessee of the vehicle, regardless of when the vehicle was manufactured).
198. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 682 (highlighting that the Geolocational Privacy and
Security Act could prohibit businesses from disclosing geographical tracking data, as well as
provide guidelines for when such data can be accessed).
199. See Wood et al., supranote 33, at 1471.
200. Id.
201. Id. (emphasizing that taking steps to reduce vulnerability of autonomous vehicles will
affect public acceptance).
202. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 388-89 (believing this is true in light of how
rapidly technologies develop and the challenges posed to preemptively craft rules to keep pace);
see also JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A

GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 103 (2016), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research
reports/RR400/RR443-2/RANDRR443-2.pdf Anderson argues that regulatory promulgation is
fundamentally a slow process, and newness and rapid evolution in technology creates uncertainty in
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Another proposed measure would be to amend the hacking,
transportation, and criminal laws to address the potential problems with
autonomous vehicles. 20 There are not only related federal laws, but
many transportation and criminal laws specific to each state which could
205
be applicable to autonomous vehicle hacking. Amending each of these
state specific laws, and some relevant federal laws, is an onerous task
and would still leave regulation of autonomous vehicles scattered across
many different jurisdictions. 20 6 The federal government may preempt
207
state laws by creating its own regulations of autonomous vehicles.
Some believe that Congress could enact a statute that would apply
uniformly nationwide to first generation vehicles and perhaps all other
types of autonomous vehicles. 20 8 The hypothetical statute would
consolidate all federal authority relating to autonomous vehicles into a
single federal agency, delegate to the agency power to govern matters
relating to autonomous vehicles, govern civil and criminal liability
standards for cases involving autonomous vehicles, and establish a body
209
of federal autonomous vehicle privacy protection requirements.

,

3. Vehicle Manufacturer Efforts to Improve Security Systems
It is worth noting that manufacturers have powerful reputational
and economic incentives, and companies like Chrysler and Ford are
already working to improve their systems as to better compartmentalize
the ability of hackers to gain access. 2 10 Security vulnerabilities have also
been addressed by "utilizing two-way data-verification schemes . . .
routing software installs and updates through remote servers to check,
and double-check, for malware, adopting routine security protocols
like encrypting files with digital signatures, and other experimental
both rulemaking effects and of the technology itself. ANDERSON ET AL., supra.
203. See ANDERSON ET AL., supranote 202, at 105-06.

204.
205.
206.
207.

See infra Part IV.
See supra Part II.C.3.
See supra Part II.C.3.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Julie Goodrich, Comment, Driving Miss Daisy: An

Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 Hous. L. REv. 265, 292 (2013) (adding that Congress had used
its "general welfare and national security powers to create the Department of Transportation,"
whose goals include encouraging national and local governments to improve transportation).

208.

See Glancy, supra note 15, at 686-90 (proposing a solution that would be based on U.S.

congressional power to regulate interstate commerce).

209. Id.
210. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 377. The failure of an autonomous car has
serious implications on human safety and is a serious reputational risk for the manufacturer if its

vehicle is involved in an accident as people are more likely to take issue with car manufacturers. See
GILLIAN YEOMANS, LLOYD'S, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: HANDING OVER CONTROL: OPPORTUNITY
AND RISKS FOR INSURANCE 16 (2014), https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/lloyds/reports/emerging%

20risk%20reports/autonomous%20vehicles%20final.pdf.
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treatments."2 11 Interestingly, this private-sector experimentation and
research may likely become a de facto baseline for security settings due
to the slow movement of government research and budget constraints.212
Based on this information, it is important to continuously improve
response mechanisms towards the security issues, which includes both
combining new technological capabilities against hacking with that of
anticipatory legislation and preemptive regulatory planning.2 13
IV.

INTRODUCTION OF A FEDERAL AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE SAFETY
AND PROTECTION ACT REQUIRING A SPECIAL LICENSE FOR
COMMERCIAL AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE OPERATION

Current criminal, hacking, privacy, and transportation laws outlined
in Part III may indeed solve the cybersecurity issue by allowing law
enforcement access to vehicle data. 214 However, they would at the same
time, alone, raise troubling issues relating to controversial Fourth
Amendment rights. 2 15 Therefore, there is a need to seamlessly allow law
enforcement expedited access to autonomous vehicle data, without
having to prompt serious privacy issues-which may be accomplished
by requiring a special license to operate an autonomous vehicle.216 To
effectively accomplish this goal and address the autonomous vehicle
cybersecurity issue, it is necessary to craft an act that clarifies the
categories of autonomous vehicle crimes while also allowing law
enforcement more flexibility when obtaining evidence for criminal
prosecution.2 17 It will be shown that such regulation is necessary, and
consent for this type of transparency should be required for all owners
and operators of autonomous vehicles. 2 18 For additional efficiency, the
proposed act will modify only federal law and have a federal preemption
clause that would preempt not only state and other local statute
regulations, but also common law rules.219
211. Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 377; see Keith Berry, Can Your Car Be Hacked?,
CAR & DRIVER (July 2011), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/can-your-car-be-hacked-feature
("[A]utomakers are beginning to take steps to secure networks the same way the informationtechnology sector now locks down corporate servers.").
212. See Thierer & Hagemann, supranote 17, at 377-78.
213. Id. at 378.
214. See supraPart III.
215. See supraPart .A.1.
216. See infra Part IV.D-E.
217. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 686-90 (proposing a hypothetical national autonomous
vehicle act for the purposes of promoting development and adoption of autonomous vehicle
technologies by reducing legal risks and uncertainties).
218. See infra Part IV.E.
219. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding that the common
law tort action is preempted since the potential common law liability interferes with the regulatory
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This Note proposes a federal law entitled the Autonomous Vehicle
Safety and Protection Act ("AVSA"), which would create and amend
22 0
multiple provisions within title 49 of the U.S. Code. For purposes of
this Note, the AVSA, at a minimum, defines and addresses autonomous
vehicles, establishes a federal agency to oversee all regulatory programs
of autonomous vehicles, defines a category of persons, characterizes
crimes associated with autonomous vehicle hacking, describes a
person's rights with regard to privacy and status, and requires an
22 1
autonomous vehicle license ("AVL") for operators and owners.
Additionally, amendments will be offered for classifying criminal
conduct under title 18.222 Federal regulation of autonomous vehicles is
the most effective option, in light of the failure in establishing consistent
state regulation for the testing of these vehicles.223
A.

Establishmentof a FederalAgency OverseeingAll Matters
ConcerningAutonomous Vehicles

Implementation of a federal statute will authorize the creation
of a federal agency that is made part of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and it oversees all regulatory programs regarding
autonomous vehicles.224 This can be done with AVSA creating a section
within title 49 that defines the National Autonomous Vehicle Safety
Administration ("NAVSA"), which would follow similar language to

that of the NHTSA in 49 U.S.C. § 105.225 NAVSA would be an
administration in the Department of Transportation and have its own
Administrator and Secretary of Transportation to carry out chapter 301
of this title alongside the NHTSA-limited to matters concerning
autonomous vehicles, and deferring decisions on any conflicts to the
226
The amendment to 49 U.S.C. § 105
Department of Transportation.
would require the NHTSA to consult with NAVSA on all matters related
to autonomous vehicles. 2 27 Although, originally, the NHTSA would have
authority under the statute to address these concerns, the amendment
methods chosen by the federal government to achieve the Safety Act's stated goals).
220. See infra Part IV.A.
221. See infra Part IV.A-E.
222. See infra Part IV.C.
223. See supra Part II.C.2.
224. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 688-89.
225. 49 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
226. See Glancy, supra note 15, 688-89. The U.S. Department of Transportation would be
reorganized, and "U]urisdiction over regulatory programs regarding autonomous vehicles would be
transferred from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Transit
Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, and NHTSA." Id. at 688.
227. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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would prevent the NHTSA from being overburdened by the introduction
of this new technology. 228 The amendment would read:
The Administrator shall consult with the Federal Highway
Administrator on all matters related to the design, construction,
maintenance, and operation of highways. The Administrator shall
consult with the National Autonomous Vehicle Safety Administration
on all matters relatedto autonomous vehicles.229
B.

Defining CategoriesofPersons Within the Act

The AVSA would also define categories of persons that could
potentially be touched by vehicular security issues, such as the hacker,
operator, owner, mechanic, car manufacturer, tech manufacturer, and
insurance company. 230 This could be expressed in 49 U.S.C. § 30102. At
a minimum, the NAVSA would define "autonomous motor vehicle" and
"operator." 23 1 The general definitions would read:
(11) "Autonomous motor vehicle" means a vehicle driven or drawn by
mechanical or electricalpower, and manufacturedprimarilyfor
use on public streets, roads, and highways. The vehicle also has
full-self driving automation, where the driver solely provides
destination or navigation input, without being expected to be
availablefor control at any time during the trip.
(12) "Operator"means the driver ofan autonomous motor vehicle.232

228. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 688-89 (stating that a statute can be used to delegate to the
new federal agency both legislative and adjudicative power to govern all matters related to
autonomous vehicles).

229. 49 U.S.C. § 105(e).
230. See Boeglin, supra note 81, at 185 (discussing liability, including particular parties that
may be held liable for an accident caused by an autonomous vehicle). This can include the user,

owner, vehicle manufacturer, parts manufacturer, or even a government entity. Id.; see also

Goodrich, supra note 207, 288-89 (stating that it is important to clarify those who are "operating"
the vehicle, and those who "operate the vehicle in a meaningful way" to solve problems of civil and
criminal liability). In the case the vehicle is operated in a meaningful way, the fault most likely falls
on the automator or the manufacturer based on mistake or negligence. Id.

231. 49 U.S.C. § 30102.
232. See id (.' [Miotor vehicle' means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and
manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a
vehicle operated only on a rail line."); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 27, at

9-10 (categorizing fully automated vehicles in level five); see also Goodrich, supra note 207, at
288-89 (emphasizing that it is important to clarify the operator); Gurney, supra note 13, at 411
(stating that there are different levels of blameworthiness on the part of a traditional driver, versus
an operator-as such, it is recommended that traditional drivers and autonomous vehicle operators

be treated differently).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/14

32

Wing: Better Keep Your Hands on the Wheel in That Autonomous Car: Exami

KEEP YOUR HANDS ON THE WHEEL IN THATAUTONOMOUS

2016]

C.

CAR

739

Crime Characterizationand Classification Within the Act

Hacking an autonomous vehicle is merely one crime that could be
included in the AVSA. Vehicle tampering and call-efficiency motivated
233
attacks can be considered their own category of crimes as well. More
complex crimes will arise out of vehicle hacking, such as kidnapping,
drug trafficking, or use of an explosive or incendiary device, which
2 34
would all need to be distinguished when prosecuting offenders.
Codifying these laws will deter potential violators from attempting to
take over an autonomous vehicle.23 5
Given the amount of potential crimes arising from the sole crime of
hacking an autonomous vehicle, it would be wiser to codify or amend
that sole crime.236 It is unnecessary to go through each potential crime
already codified under title 18 to clarify its relation to autonomous
vehicles.2 37 Moreover, categorizing autonomous vehicle crimes as
federal crimes would be more effective considering the large variations
238
in state law and the strong interstate nature of vehicle hacking. This
Note proposes an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 that intends to
increase the scope of fraud and related activity in connection with
239 More
computers past those already given under the CFAA.
specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 would include in its list under the term
240
"computer" to also mean a motor vehicle or an autonomous vehicle. It
is unnecessary to clarify that all other crimes arising out of this section
involving unauthorized access to a motor vehicle or an autonomous
1
vehicle are punishable, in addition to the initial hacking crime.2 This is
inherently established U.S. law.2 42 For illustrative purposes, other crimes
233.

See Goodrich, supra note 207, at 286-87 (recommending that the criminal legal system

should codify laws relating to autonomous vehicles, including laws that prohibit "virtual carjacking
and essentially equating the crime with today's prohibitions against manual carijacking"); see also
Gurney, supranote 13, at 411 (examining at least four types of criminal laws that may be implicated

by autonomous vehicles and might require clarity: (1) general traffic laws, (2) DUI laws, (3)
reckless driving and due care laws, and (4) vehicular manslaughter).
234. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.

235.

See Goodrich, supra note 207, at 286-87.

236.

See supra Part 11I.A.2.

237. See supra Part II.A.2.
238. See supra Part II.C.3.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
240. Id. § 1030(e) (defining a computer as an "electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical,
or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in
conjunction with such device").

241. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense,
the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.").
242. Id.
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can include those listed within the same title: explosives (chapter 39);243
kidnapping (chapter 55);24 or stolen property (chapter 113).245 I
addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) takes into consideration greater
punishment under the initial hacking crime for an "offense [that] was
committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State." 246
It is recommended that 18 U.S.C. § 1030 impose even greater penalties
for offenses committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious
act in relation to unauthorized access to a motor vehicle or an
autonomous vehicle.247
D.

The Scope of the Right to Privacy and OperatorRequirements

'

Beneficial to the proposed regulations mentioned above, and in
consideration of the grave impact associated with the potential crimes,
the legal system should also codify laws which may allow law
enforcement officials better access to autonomous vehicle data stored in
the vehicle system and in local state departments.24 8 The privacy
concerns and issues associated with the emergence of this new
technology will have to be adequately addressed or circumvented.2 49
Autonomous vehicles include operator personal information-from
components like EDRs-which may need to be used by law enforcement
officials when prosecuting criminals.250 If officials have a hard time
getting around privacy concerns with respect to vehicle operators in
obtaining access to this data, criminal prosecution becomes slow and
deterrence of autonomous vehicle crimes would be very ineffective.25
Therefore, there is a strong interest to allow some way for law
enforcement officials to delicately overcome some privacy issues.252
243. 18 U.S.C. § 831.
244. Id § 1201.
245. Id. § 2312.
246. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (providing punishment for fraud and related crimes in connection
with computers).
247. See Gurney, supra note 13, at 441-42 (stating that the federal government is in the best
position to prosecute hackers, and that regulators should amend criminal laws in such a way to

provide for a smooth transition of autonomous vehicles into the marketplace).
248.

See supra Part

13.B.2.

249. See Glancy, supra note 134, at 1172-73 (explaining that in the future, autonomous
vehicles will need to accommodate privacy interests, which can include autonomy privacy interests,
personal information privacy interests, and surveillance privacy interests). The future success of
autonomous vehicles will very much depend on how well privacy interests and autonomous vehicles

can work together. Id. at 1239.
250.

See supraPart M.A.2.

251. See supraPart J.A.2.
252. See infra Part IV.D-E.
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Given that autonomous vehicle computer systems and data are
continuously connected and transmitting data, most data records will
likely be stored at state DMVs. 253 As mentioned, this data will include
information recorded from a vehicle EDR, GPS, and anything mandated
25 4
by law, including accident reconstruction data. Therefore, limiting
the protection provided by DPPA would be a possible approach given
that it protects an individual's personal information held by the state
DMV against disclosure, without the written consent of that individual,
unless a statutory exception applies. 255 The statutory exception can be
implemented in this statute or another statute. Specifically, chapter 123
of title 18 of the U.S. Code can be amended to include such a
statutory exemption.
In 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b), Congress already provides for government
access of "personal information" or "highly restricted personal
information" for cases "in connection with matters of motor vehicle or
driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product
alterations, recalls, or advisories; [and] performance monitoring of motor
25 6
The pertinent
vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers."
agency,
government
any
by
use
"[fjor
disclosures include those
out
carrying
in
including any court or law enforcement agency,
a
of
its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf
Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions," and
"in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral
proceeding in any .. . court or agency ... including the service of
process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or
enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a
Federal, State, or local court." 257 Though these pertinent disclosures
encompass both personal information and highly restricted personal
information, clarification and an expansion of what can be included are
still needed. 258 This will require an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2725,
which defines personal information to include data from autonomous
253. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012) (prohibiting some release of personal information by a
state's DMV). Information includes information that identifies an individual-such as an
individual's "photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name,
address .. . telephone number, and medical or disability information." Id. § 2725(3). Highly
restricted personal information can include an individual's social security number, and medical or
disability information. Id. § 2725(4).
254. See Trop, supra note 18; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (excluding information on
vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 2721; see Glancy, supra note 134, at 1204 ("Simply not having personal
information-through limiting personal information ... helps to minimize these [privacy] risks.").
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2).
257. Id. § 2721(b)(1), (4).
258. Id. § 2721(a).
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vehicle EDR, GPS, accident reconstruction software, and anything
deemed relevant by NAVSA. 259
Next, consider the information that is retained in private company
databases.260 It is recommended to ask to whom such data might be
transmitted, and under what circumstances, as well as to distinguish
between the degrees of personally identifiable information.26 1 It has been
noted that these specific privacy concerns "can be remedied by a
combination of private self-regulation, tort law ... consumer watchdog
pressure and press attention. "262
Finally, there is also information that could remain with the vehicle,
which has not been transferred to the local state department because of a
possible delay or incident. 2 63 Access to this information would be
outside the scope of the DPPA and likely requires balancing access to
the information with that of a reasonable search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.2M If, however, that information was required to be
transferred to the local state department-where the government could
nonetheless access it under chapter 123 of title 18-there would not
actually be a violation of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy by
accessing the same information under comparable means. 2 65 Therefore,
for this particular case, further specific expansions to the ECPA,
CALEA, and Telecommunications Act should be considered but not
enacted at this time-it would be too early at this stage to start applying
specific solutions to clarify the privacy doctrines for access to vehicle
information until it is seen if the technology proceeds as currently
expected.2 66 This Note's proposed amendments can also have an indirect
259. Id. § 2725.
260. See supraPart m.B.3.
261. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 383 (stating that the transmission of very
personally identifiable information raises more legitimate privacy concerns).

262. Id. at 383-84 (highlighting, for example, that the Future of Privacy Forum launched a
Connected Cars Project to promote practices in privacy and data security that would best recognize

the benefits of the new vehicle technology).
263. See Glancy, supra note 134, at 1180 (discussing self-contained autonomous vehicles,
where personal information would be concentrated on-board the vehicle). This personal information

contained in the vehicle could potentially be accessed by investigators, both private and
governmental. Id

264. 18 U.S.C. § 2721. The DPPA only protects personal information gathered by state DMVs.
Id Balancing tests (as opposed to bright line tests) have been used in many privacy cases in which
the law enforcement need is weighed against an individual's right to privacy, but such tests have

never been applied to the situation at hand. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-06
(1981) (considering factors such as the safety of the officer and the preservation of evidence).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
266.

See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 27, at 21 (stating that more

research needs to be done before enacting a regulatory standard in relation to the cybersecurity
issues); see also Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 388-89. Forbearance at this stage is
suitable. See id. Many of the suggested security and privacy concerns may never materialize, and
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impact on these doctrines, providing all the more reason to wait and see
how this emerging technology will begin to shape the law.267
In addition, the recommended policies "should not be converted
into a regulatory straitjacket that uniformly mandates data collection
and use practices according to a centralized blueprint. In the future,
some automakers . .. might craft creative data-sharing policies that

provide .. . [a] myriad [of] unanticipated benefits."26 8 Flexible and
evolving practices for data collection-not just for autonomous vehicles
but all developing technology-would ultimately better serve consumers
and society. 26 9 Policymakers need not respond to these issues
preemptively and should be mindful that the right answers might not be
available at this time. 27 0 Another real challenge concerning an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy arises when a situation
requires law enforcement officials to engage in a vehicle pullover.2 7' The
AVSA needs to allow some level of permission for certain officials to
authorize vehicle pullovers-while avoiding controversial privacy
issues, so that important evidence may be quickly obtained or if it would
be necessary to stop a live vehicle that may be suspected of being
hijacked.2 72 Generally, a law enforcement official can pull over the
vehicle if she has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
occurred. 2 73 This Note does not address the question of whether a federal
or state official is allowed to pull over and search an autonomous vehicle
based on what is potentially a violation of existing federal law. Rather, it
recommends autonomous vehicle pullovers be delegated to a specific
federal agency and that pullovers and searches be required by owners
and operators of autonomous vehicles under a more flexible probable
cause standard, as a condition of obtaining an AVL. 274 This would be
effective in circumventing, and even solving, the controversial issue of
society may very well quickly adapt to a world filled with autonomous vehicles, based on adequate
initial regulation or, even, universal acceptance by the public. Id.
267. See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 17, at 389 (stating that creative solutions may have

to be pursued as issues develop since it is impossible to anticipate every possible issue, concern, or
scenario in advance).

268. Id. at 385.
269. Id. at 385-86 ("Serendipitous discoveries can only materialize in a policy environment
that embraces trial and error experimentation.").

270. Id. at 386.
271. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 130, at 1166 (expressing that the prospect of a law
enforcement officer having the ability to pull over and track movements of any suspected vehicles

will increase public concern).
272. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 686-90 (hypothesizing that it is possible to establish a body
of "federal autonomous vehicle privacy protection requirements," which would preempt state

privacy laws that would otherwise apply in the context of autonomous vehicles).
273. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
274. See infra Part IV.E.
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whether or not it is necessary to bolster Fourth Amendment constraints
on governmental attempts to access data from autonomous vehicles.2 75
E.

Characterizingthe Application and Extent ofAutonomous
Vehicle Licenses

Much like how licenses have been required to test autonomous
vehicles in the past years, it would also be effective, and consistent with
present regulation, to require a specific license to operate them. 276 This
may potentially resolve privacy concerns operators and owners might
have.277 The license would require all autonomous vehicle operators and
owners to comply with the relevant state and federal regulations,
including those implemented under AVSA.27 8 In the United States,
driver licenses are issued individually by each state's DMV rather than
by the federal government based on each state having their own
domestic laws with regard to driving.279 However, the national concerns
with regard to autonomous vehicles support a recommendation for
imposing a more uniform standard for AVLs. 280 Federal requirements
can be applied to each state's licensing requirements, requiring those
who want to own or operate an autonomous vehicle to meet federal
standards for issuance by the state or, perhaps, federal government.2 81
Proceeding from how a license is made a requirement to test an
autonomous vehicle, California is wrestling with the question of how it
may require motorists to undergo additional instruction or evaluation
before they can operate these vehicles.282 This includes classroom
275.

See infra Part IV.E.

276.

See Mary Slosson, Google Gets First Self-Driven Car License in Nevada, REUTERS

(May 8, 2012, 6:39 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/uk-usa-nevada-googleidUSLNE84701320120508 (stating that since the DMV licensed a Toyota Prius modified by
Google, Nevada plans to eventually license autonomous vehicles owned by members of the public);
see also S. 343, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016) (proposing legislation to require that "[a] person
shall not operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode unless that person has obtained an

endorsement on that person's driver's license to operate an autonomous vehicle").
277. See supra Part H.A.1.
278.
279.

See supra Part IV.A.
See Driver's Guide to Licenses, Registration & DMV Locations, DMV.ORG, http://www.

dmv.org/drivers-guide (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
280. See supraPart III. A.
281. See supraPart IV.
282. See Mark Harris, Will You Need a New License to Operate a Self-Driving Car?,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 2, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/

human-factors/will-you-need-a-new-license-to-operate-a-selfdriving-car; see also Kirsten Korosec,
Kia Motors' Road to Self-Driving Cars Goes Through Nevada, FORTUNE (Dec. 15, 2015, 11:10
AM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/15/kia-self-driving-cars; Beth Stebner, Look, No Hands! Google's
Self-Driving Cars Set to Hit the Roads of Nevada After Being GrantedLicence, DAILY MAIL (May

8, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2141308/Google-driverless-car-
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lessons on the abilities and limitations of autonomous technologies,
computer simulations of failures, and real-world driving sessions-all of
which could be made as a pre-requisite for obtaining an AVL. 283 Despite
the view that individuals have compared an autonomous vehicle with
that of a train or a bus which may eliminate the need for a license
completely, individuals that hold this view assume that no driver
intervention will be allowed and that no external interference will
occur. 28 4 The California DMV released a set of proposed guidelines: (1)
a person may not operate an autonomous vehicle unless that person has a
driver's license, and obtains a certificate to operate the vehicle; (2) a
licensed operator would be required to sit in the driver's seat, ready to
take over should an event that requires immediate attention occurs; and
(3) the driver would also be liable for any roadway violations. 285 This
sort of a requirement for drivers can be made a national standard, where
AVL requirements can be proposed by NAVSA and enforced by federal
enforcement agencies or even local state departments.28 6
V.

CONCLUSION

The most efficient method to address the cybersecurity concerns
associated with the hacking of autonomous vehicles is to implement a
7
federal statute that preempts state and common law regulations. 28 The
issues that develop from the emergence of autonomous vehicles are too

licence-Self-driving-cars-set-hit-Nevada-roads.html (explaining that Google's cars will display red
plates and an infinity symbol to represent their status as vehicles of the future).
283. See Harris,supra note 282 (noting that the car companies themselves can issue the prerequisite training for its test drivers, rather than the federal or state govemment-"Google requires
that its test drivers complete weeks of in-depth lessons and rigorous exams, while Audi's entire
program lasts just a couple of hours").
284. See Doug Newcomb, You Won't Need a Driver's License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17,

2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/ieee-autonomous-2040 (stating that people do not
need a license to sit on a train or a bus).
285. Autonomous Vehicle Express Terms, ST. CAL. DEP'T MOTOR VEHICLES (Sept. 30, 2016),

3 4
7
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/ed6f 8fe-fe 8- 1 00-b5c2-1656f555e841/AVExpress
Terms.pdfMOD-AJPERES (providing that a person must complete a training program conducted
by the manufacturer to obtain a certificate that allows the operation of an autonomous vehicle). The
training program includes, but is not limited to, demonstrating "how to engage and disengage the

autonomous mode, how to override unauthorized or spurious commands received by the
autonomous technology in the event of a cyberattack, and the operator's responsibility to monitor
the safe operation of the vehicle at all times." Id; see Transp. Mgmt., Autonomous Vehicles:
California to Require Licensed Drivers in Driverless Vehicles, ROADS & BRIDGES (Dec. 17, 2015),

http://www.roadsbridges.com/autonomous-vehicles-california-require-licensed-drivers-driverlessvehicles (explaining that the DMV's actions could lead to better research on autonomous vehicles
regarding human behavior and interaction).
286. See supra Part IV.A.
287. See supra Part IV.A.
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prevalent and diverse such that it would be more effective to create and
amend patchworks of federal law, rather than state law.288 Nevertheless,
it is crucial to impose requirements on operators and owners of
autonomous vehicles since it would grant law enforcement officials a
more effective means of prosecuting criminals-the main requirement
being that vehicle operators need an AVL, which would automatically
subject them to greater transparency regarding their vehicle data under
new federal law. 289 These requirements would also ease the development
of impending autonomous vehicle regulations, as new technology
generally has a great deal of unanticipated consequences on society.29 0
Christopher Wing*

288.

See supra Parts II-1.

289.

See supra Part IV.E.

290. See supra Part IV.
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University; M.S.
Candidate in Physics, 2017, City College of New York; B.S. in Physics, 2013, Brooklyn College.
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